We address the problem of characterising the security of a program against unauthorised information flows. Classical 
Introduction
Non-interference was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer in their seminal paper [8] in order to provide an appropriate formalism for the specification of security policies. In its original formulation it states that: "One group of users, using a certain set of commands, is noninterfering with another group of users if what the first group does with those commands has no effect on what the second group of users can see".
This notion has been widely used to model various security properties. One such property is confidentiality which is concerned with how information is allowed to flow through a computer system. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of definitions of confidentiality, all based on the central idea of indistinguishability of behaviours: In order to establish that there is no information flow between two objects and , it is sufficient to establish that for any pair of behaviours of the system that differ only in 's behaviour, 's observations cannot distinguish these two behaviours [16] . For systems where non-determinism is present, the problem of characterising the equality of two behaviours is not a trivial one. In fact, there is no notion of system equivalence which everybody agrees upon; which notion is appropriate among , for example, trace or failure equivalence, (various forms of) bisimulation and (various forms of) testing equivalence, depends on the context and application in question.
Another common aspect of these various formulations of confidentiality is that they all treat information flows in a binary fashion: they are either allowed to flow or not. Models for confidentiality typically characterise the absence of information flow between objects (across interfaces or along channels) by essentially reducing non-interference to confinement. Depending on the nature of the information flow one can characterise different confinement properties, namely deterministic, nondeterministic, and probabilistic confinement [25] .
It is important to notice that nondeterministic confinement is weaker than probabilistic confinement, as it is not able to capture those situations in which the probabilistic nature of an implementation may allow for the detection of the confidential information, e.g. by running the program a sufficient number of times [9] . In the context of imperative programming languages, confinement properties with respect to the value of high and low level variables, have been recently discussed in [22, 26, 23] where a type-system based security analysis is developed. Another recent contribution to this problem is the work in [17, 18] , where the use of probabilistic power-domains is proposed, which allows for a compositional specification of the non-interference property underlying a type-based security analysis.
Although non-interference is the simplest characterisation of confidentiality, it has several problems [15] . One is that absolute non-interference can hardly ever be achieved in real systems. On the other hand, often computer systems "are not intended to be completely secure" [27] . As a consequence, notions of non-interference such as confine- ment turn out to be too strong as characterisation of the noninterference criterion effectively used in practice (especially in their non-deterministic version).
In this work we approach the problem of confidentiality by looking at models which are able to give a quantitative estimate of the information flowing through a system. Such models abandon the purely qualitative binary view of the information flow by characterising how much information is actually "leaking" from the system rather than the complete absence of any flow. This allows us to define a notion of non-interference which is approximate and yet able to capture the security properties of a system in a more "realistic" way: in real systems high-level input interferes with low-level output all the time [15] .
The key idea of our approach is to replace indistinguishability by similarity in the basic formalisation of noninterference. As a result, two behaviours though distinguishable might still be considered as effectively noninterfering provided that their difference is below a threshold¯. A similarity relation can be defined by means of an appropriate notion of distance and provides information (thē ) on "how much" two behaviours differ from each other. This information is not relevant in equivalence relations such as observational equivalence or bisimilarity, where the comparison between two behaviours is aimed to establish whether they can be identified or not. We will formalise our approach in a particular process algebraic framework including probabilistic constructs which allow us to deal with probabilistic information flows. Such a framework is Probabilistic Concurrent Constraint Programming (PCCP) and will be presented in Section 2. The notion of identity confinement expressing confidentiality in PCCP is then defined in Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce an approximate version of the identity confinement and give a statistical interpretation of the quantity¯measuring the approximation. Finally, we will propose two analyses of the approximate confinement property based respectively on a concrete (Section 5) and an abstract (Section 6) semantics, and show the correctness of the abstract analysis with respect to the concrete semantics. We conclude with a summary and an outline of some further research directions in Section 7.
Probabilistic CCP
We illustrate our approach by referring to a probabilistic declarative language, namely Probabilistic Concurrent Constraint Programming (PCCP) language, which was introduced in [6, 7] as a probabilistic version of the Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) paradigm [20, 19] . This language can be seen as a kind of process algebra enhanced with a notion of computational state.
The syntax and the basic execution model of PCCP are very similar to CCP. Both languages are based on the notion of a generic constraint system , defined as a cylindric algebraic complete partial order (see [20, 4] for more details), which encodes the information ordering. In PCCP probability is introduced via a probabilistic choice which replaces the nondeterministic choice of CCP, and a form of probabilistic parallelism, which replaces the pure nondeterminism in the interleaving semantics of CCP by introducing priorities. The concrete syntax of a PCCP agent is given in Table 1 , where and are finite constraints in , and Ô and Õ are real numbers representing probabilities.
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of PCCP is defined in terms of a probabilistic transition system,´ ÓÒ Ô µ, where ÓÒ is the set of configurations representing the state of the system at a certain moment and the transition relation Ô is defined in Table 2 . The state of the system is described by the agent which has still to be executed, and the common store . The index Ô in the transition relation indicates the probability of the transition to take place. The rules are closely related to the ones for nondeterministic CCP, and we refer to [4] for a detailed description. The rules for probabilistic choice and prioritised parallelism involve a normalisation process needed to re-distribute the probabilities among those agents which can actually be chosen for execution. Such agents must be enabled (i.e. the corresponding guards ask´ µ succeed) or active (i.e. able to make a transition). The probability after normalisation is denoted by Ô .
Observables
The notion of observables we consider in this paper refers to the probabilistic input/output behaviour of a PCCP agent. We will define the observables Ç´ µ of an agent in store as a probability distribution on constraints. Formally, this is defined as an element in the real vector space:
that is the free vector space obtained as the set of all formal linear combinations of elements in . The coefficients Ü represent the probability associated to constraints .
Operationally, a distribution Ç´ µ corresponds to the set of all pairs Ô , where is the result of a finite computation of starting in store and Ô is the probability of computing that result. We define formally such a set of results as follows. Given a PCCP program, the set Ê of the results of an agent is the multi-set of all pairs Ô , where is the final store corresponding to the least upper bound of the partial constraints accumulated during a computational path, and Ô is the probability of reaching that result:
Definition 1
There might be different computational paths leading to the same result. Thus, we need to "compactify" the results so as to identify all those pairs with the same constraint as a first component. We can now define the observables of an agent with respect to store as:
Ç´ µ Ã´Ê´ µµ
In the following we will adopt the convention that whenever the initial store is omitted then it is intended to be ØÖÙ .
Identity Confinement
The original idea of non-interference as stated in [8] can be expressed in the PCCP formalism via the notion of identity confinement. Roughly, this notion establishes whether it is possible to identify which process is running in a given program. Therefore, given a set of agents and a set of potential intruders, the latter cannot see what the former set is doing, or more precisely, no spy is able to find out which of the agents in the first group is actually being executed.
We illustrate the notion of identity confinement via an example borrowed from [18] where the setting is that of imperative languages. This example also show the difference between non-deterministic and probabilistic (identity) confinement.
Example 1
In an imperative language, confinement -as formulated for example in [17, 18] As explained in Section 2.2, the observables of a PCCP agent correspond to a distribution on the constraint system, that is a vector in the space Î´ µ. The difference between two observables can then be measured by means of a norm.
We adopt here the supremum norm ¡ ½ formally defined as ´Ü µ ¾Á ½ ×ÙÔ ¾Á Ü , where´Ü µ ¾Á represents a probability distribution. In the following we will sometimes omit the index ½. It is easy to check that for the agents hOn and hOff of the previous example the simple agent Ë ask´onµ 
Approximate Confinement
The confinement notion discussed above is exact in the sense that it refers to the equivalence of the agents' behaviour.
However, sometimes it is practically more useful to base confinement on some similarity notion. The intuitive idea behind such a notion is that we look at how much the behaviours of two agents differ, instead of qualitatively asserting whether they are identical or not. In particular, in the probabilistic case we can measure the distance between the distributions representing the agents' observables instead of checking whether this difference is ¼. We can then say that the agents are -confined for some ¼. The notion of approximate confinement we will discuss in the following is based on the idea of measuring how much the behaviour of two agents differs if we put them in a certain context. We will discuss first different kinds of such contexts, which we will refer to as spies.
Admissible Spies
Security depends on the quality of the possible attacker. Clearly, no system is secure against an omnipotent attacker. Therefore, it makes sense to restrict our consideration to particular classes of spies [13] .
We will consider simple attackers expressed in PCCP by:
where ¾ are fresh constraints, that is constraints which never appear in the execution of the host agents, and ¾ .
These agents are passive and memoryless attackers: They do not change the behaviour of the hosts, and are only allowed to interact with the store in one step. Nevertheless, they are sufficient for formalising quite powerful timing attacks as described for example in [11] . A generalisation of this class is to consider active spies (e.g. Example 4 and Example 3) and/or spies with memory such as ask´ µ Ô ask´ µ Õ tell´ µ. 
Approximate Identity Confinement
We introduce a notion of approximate confinement which is a generalisation of the identity confinement introduced in [5] and defined in Section 3. The definition we give is parametric with respect to a set of admissible spies Ë and scheduling priorities Ô and Õ ½ Ô. We say that two agents and are approximately confined with respect to a set of spies Ë iff there exists an ¼ such that for all Ë ¾ Ë the distance between the observables of Ô Õ Ë and Ô Õ Ë is smaller than . We consider as a measure for this distance the supremum norm ¡ ½ as in Definition 4. This definition can be generalised to a set of more than two agents. Obviously, if two agents and are -confined with ¼ then they are probabilistically identity confined.
The number depends on the particular class of spies Ë and in some sense can be seen as a measure of the "power" of Ë. In fact, it is strongly related to the number of tests a spy needs to perform in order to reveal the identity of the host agents. We will make this argument more precise in the next section.
Statistical Interpretation of
The notion of approximate confinement is strongly related to statistical concepts, in particular to so-called hypothesis testing (see e.g. [21] ).
Let us consider the following situation: We have two agents and which are attacked by a spy Ë. Furthermore, we assume that and are -confined with respect to Ë. This means that the observables Ç´ Ëµ and Ç´ Ëµ are -similar (we ignore in this argument the concrete scheduling probabilities, i.e. we write Ë instead of Ô Õ Ë). In particular, we can identify some constraint such that Ô ´ µ Ô ´ µ where Ô ´ µ is the probability of the result in an execution of Ë and Ô ´ µ is the probability that is a result of Ë. Following the standard interpretation of probabilities as "long-run" relative frequencies, we can thus expect that the number of times we get as result of an execution of Ë and Ë will differ "on the long run" by exactly a factor .
For an unknown agent we can try do determine Ô ´ µ experimentally by executing Ë over and over again. Assuming that is actually the same as either or we know that the Ô ´ µ we obtain must be either Ô ´ µ or Ô ´ µ. We thus can easily determine this way if or , i.e. reveal the identity of (if
Unfortunately -as J.M. Keynes pointed out -we are all dead on the long run. The above described experimental setup is therefore only of theoretical value. For practically purposes we need a way to distinguish and by finite executions of Ë and Ë. If we execute Ë and Ë a finite number of -say Ò -times, now to determine how much the identification of with is "more correct" than identifying with .
For finite experiments we can only make a guess about the true identity of , but never definitely reveal its identity. The confidence we can have in our guess -i.e. the probability that we make a correct guess -depends on two factors: The number of tests Ò and the difference between the observables of Ë and Ë.
Hypothesis Formulation
The problem is to determine experimentally if an unknown agent is one of two known agents and . The only way we can obtain information about is by executing it in parallel with a spy Ë. In this way we can get an experimental estimate for the observables of Ë. We then can compare this estimate with the observables of Ë and Ë. We can then formulate a hypothesis À about the identity of , namely either that " is " or that " is " depending on the fact that this estimate is closer to Ç´ Ëµ or Ç´ Ëµ. More precisely, the method to formulate the hypothesis À about the identity of the unknown process consists of the two following steps: In the following we use the notation Ô ´ µ and Ô Ò ´ µ to indicate the probability assigned to in the distribution representing the observables Ç´ Ëµ and in the experimental average Ç Ò´ Ëµ respectively.
If we assume that there are only finitely many constraints with non-zero probability in the observables then there exists a constraint where the difference between Ç Ò and Ç is maximal. We therefore can look at a simplified situation where we are considering only this single constraint . Let us assume without loss of generality that Ô ´ µ Ô ´ µ as in the diagram below:
If the experimental value Ô Ò ´ µ we obtained in our test is anywhere to the left of Ô ´ µ · ¾ then the hypothesis À we formulate (based on Ô Ò ´ µ) will be the correct one: " is "; if the experimental value is to the right of Ô ´ µ · ¾ we will formulate the incorrect hypothesis: " is ". Now assume that is . Then the probability È´Àµ that we will formulate the correct hypothesis is:
To estimate È´Àµ we therefore have just to estimate the probability È´Ô Ò ´ µ Ô ´ µ · ¾µ that the experimental value Ô Ò ´ µ is left of Ô ´ µ · ¾.
Confidence Estimation
The confidence we can have in the hypothesis we formulated can be determined by various statistical methods. We consider here methods which allow us to estimate the probability that an experimental average Ò , like Ô Ò ´ µ, is within a certain distance from the corresponding expectation value ´ µ, like Ô Ò ´ µ, i.e. the probability È´ Ò ´ µ µ, for some ¼. These methods are essentially all based on the central limit theorem, see e.g. [1, 10, 21] . The type of tests we consider here to formulate a hypothesis about the identity of the unknown agent are described in statistical terms by so called Bernoulli Trials. The central limit theorem for this type of tests [10, Thm 9.2], gives us an estimate for the probability that the experimental value Ë Ò Ò ¡ Ò is in a certain interval : Unfortunately, the integral (of the so called standard normal density) on the right side of the above expression is not easy to obtain. In practical situations one has to resort to numerical methods (or statistical tables), but it allows usat least in principle -to say something about È´Àµ.
Identifying Ë Ò with Ò ¡ Ô Ò we can utilise the above expression to estimate the probability È´Ô ´ µ · ¾ Ô Ò µ which determines È´Àµ. In order to do this we have to take:
This allows us (in principle) to compute the probability:
Approximating -as it is common in statistics) -
We see that the only way to increase the probability È´Àµ, i.e. the confidence that we formulate the right hypothesis about the identity of , is by minimising the integral. In order to do this we have to increase the lower bound ¼ of the integral. This can be achieved -as one would expect -by increasing the number Ò of experiments.
We can also see that for a smaller we have to perform more tests Ò to reach the same level of confidence, È´Àµ: The smaller Ò the harder it is to distinguish and experimentally. Note that for ¼ , the probability of correctly guessing which of the agents and is in the black box is ½ ¾ , which is the best blind guess we can make anyway. In other words: for ¼ we cannot distinguish between and .
Analysis: Concrete Semantics
The -confinement property of a PCCP program can be checked by means of a semantics-based static analysis of the program. In this section we will consider a concrete collecting semantics which describes the same observables defined in Section 2.2 in a slightly more abstract way than the transition system in Table 2 . The analysis we present will allow us to calculate an exact for measuring the confinement of a set of agents. In Section 6 we will present a compositional semantics for PCCP which will allow us to calculate a correct approximation of the in a more abstract and simplified way.
A Collecting Semantics
We will base our analysis on a collecting semantics consisting of distributions over the set ÓÒ of configurations. Such distributions represent all the possible configurations which are reachable by a given program in one step. They are vectors in the space Î´ ÓÒ µ obtained by means of a free construction similar to the one described for the space of constraints Î´ µ, and can be represented as multi-sets of pairs:¨ Ô where Ô represents the probability associated to the configuration . Note that one configuration can occur more than once in a multi-set¨. In this case the corresponding distribution will be obtained by compactifying the set as described in Section 2.2 and then normalising the resulting set.
The collecting semantics for PCCP is defined by the rules given in Table 3 
Ç´ µ Ð Ñ
The proof of this proposition relies on a result on the existence of the limit of the sequence´ ´ ØÖÙ µµ which we will omit for lack of space. Table 4 . 
Example 5 The collecting semantics for the two agents and in Example 2 is depicted in
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Limit Analysis
Starting from the formulas 
Properties of a Spy
Proposition 3 Given an agent
Ë ¾ Ë ¾ of the form Ë ask´ ½ µ Õ ½ tell´ ½ µ ask´ ¾ µ Õ ¾ tell´ ¾ µ
The Most Effective Spy
The limit analysis in Section 5.3 shows that the most effective spy for a fixed pair of guards´ ½ ¾ µ is obtained by considering a choice distribution where Ð Ñ Õ ½ ¼ and Ð Ñ Õ ¾ ½ or vice versa. In other words the "best" spy is the one where the probabilities are at the extreme opposite. 
Analysis: Abstract Semantics
The use of an exact (collecting) semantics makes the analysis presented in the previous sections precise: no approximation is introduced in the calculation of¯.
We introduce here a semantics which is more abstract than the collecting semantics but still allows for a useful though approximated analysis. We associate to each agent a set of tuples. Each tuple Ø Ô consists of two constraints and , a time stamp Ø and a probability Ô. It represents a transition from a store ¼ to store , which takes place at step Ø (at the earliest in a particular path) with probability Ô, provided that the current store ¼ entails . The time stamp Ø is interpreted as a step counter and will be used to extract information about the number Ñ of the previous section.
The choice agent is modelled by the union of all tuples in the semantics of sub-agents where the first constraint We use the operator Ö AE Ò to approximate the semantics of a procedure call by "unwinding" it until the probability of a further continuation gets smaller than AE or until we reach a maximal recursion depth Ò. The unwinding is defined in Table 6 : We start by a trivial approximation Ö AE ¼ and continue by replacing the procedure call Ô in the term by the previous approximation -denoted by Ô Ö AE ´ µ -until the difference between the current and previous approximation becomes small enough (less or equal to AE) or we reach the maximal recursion depth Ò. In this case we take an approximation Ö AE ½ in place of further unwindings.
The difference between two approximations is the difference of the two sets of tuples seen as vector distributions Ø Ô . The final approximation of a procedure call is then given as:
which is effectively always reached after a finite number of unwindings. This can lead to a substantial overapproximation of Ø for recursive agents. The operator Ö AE Ò is the quantitative analogue of a widening operator in the standard approaches to abstract interpretation [3] ; whilst the standard definition of a widening involves overapproximation (of an upper bound), in the quantitative setting we settle for "closeness".
Abstract Security Analysis
Given the set of quadruples associated with an agent, we can extract the set of abstract paths of execution:
Since the analysis of choice does not normalise the associated probabilities, the probabilities in È Ø ×´ µ may be smaller than in the concrete semantics.
Given a path ¾ È Ø ×´ µ with c first entailed in Õ and ¼ first entailed in Õ , the difference Ø Õ Ø Õ defines the (abstract) number of steps Ñ between the store entailing and the store ¼ in path , while Ô , which is the product of the probabilities, is the abstract probability associated to . Therefore, for each pair of constraints ½ and ¾ , the abstract analysis of program È gives us the set:
Correctness of the Analysis
In order to state the correctness of the analysis, we need to define concrete computation paths. We use the following definition (note that we are only considering finite computations): By analogy with the previous section, for each pair of constraints ½ and ¾ , we define:
Given these definitions we can state the correctness of the analysis.
Proposition 5
Proof (Informal sketch): For each concrete computation path there is at least one abstract path. As already discussed in the previous section, the analysis of choice, which does not normalise the probabilities, implies that 
Conclusions
We introduced a quantitative measure describing the vulnerability of a set of agents against some kind of attacks aimed at revealing their identity. Based on this measure we then defined the notion of -confinement. This notion differs from strict confinement -which aims in determining if agents are absolutely invulnerable -by allowing for some exactly quantified weaknesses. The confinement measure can be interpreted in statistical terms as the probability of guessing the right hypothesis about the identity of the host agent after a given number of tests. For a smaller a larger number of experiments must be performed to reach the same level of confidence.
In a second step we identified for each agent and an admissible spy two numbers, Ñ and Ò, which forecast the observables of the agent in the presence of the spy. The collection of all Ñ's and Ò's characterises an agent with respects to attacks by any admissible spy. We showed that for the most effective attackers the collection of Ñ's alone is sufficient to determine the corresponding observables. The information on the Ñ's is therefore all we need to know of a set of agents in order to compute their -confinement.
Finally, we observed that if we are able to determine some range for the Ñ's -instead of their exact valueswe can still compute the range of possible observables and compare them to get a correct approximation of the . Following this argument we formulated an abstract semantics which produces estimates -i.e. bounds -of the Ñ's.
It is important to note that this abstract analysis only makes sense for approximate confinement notion. If we had to consider strict confinement any non-exact estimation of the Ñ's would fail to give a meaningful result: only if we know the Ñ's exactly can we tell if
The notion of -confinement we introduced requires that the behaviour of an agent is described by some objecti.e. observables -and that we have a way to measure the similarity of such objects. A similarity relation provides information about such quantity, whereas equivalence relations such as observational equivalence or bisimilarity can only establish whether two objects can be identified or not. For example, in [13] the security of cryptographic protocols is specified via an observational equivalence relation which identifies protocols which differ asymptotically for a polynomial factor. Such quantity is nevertheless neither used to quantify the similarity of the protocols nor to calculate a correspondent approximation level of the protocols security property. Analogously, the bisimulation through probabilistic testing of Larsen and Skou [12] allows to state the indistinguishability of two processes with respect to socalled testable properties. These are properties that can be tested up to a given level AE of significance which gives an upper bound of making the wrong decision. Again such a quantity is not intended to provide a quantitative measure of the behavioural difference between two processes.
The quantity measuring the similarity of two objects could be formalised mathematically by a norm, a metric, or some other appropriate notion of distance, depending on the domain of objects used to describe the behaviour of programs. In this paper we concentrated on the probabilistic input/output observables of PCCP programs which can be described by probability distributions on the underlying space of constraints, and we used a vector norm to measure their similarity. In [24] van Breugel and Worrell consider instead derivation trees together with a pseudo-metric to achieve a similar weakening of the concept of behavioural equivalence of concurrent processes. The type of attacks we considered in this paper are internal attacks where the attacker is in some sense part of the observed system: in particular it is scheduled like any other agent. In another context one might be interested in external attacks, where the attacker is only allowed to observe the system from the outside and is thus scheduled in a different way, or one might impose other restrictions on the way a spy may observe the agents in question. It is obvious that for different types of attacks we need different types of quantitative information for our analysis. For external attacks, for example, a useful information is the average store of an agent in some specified number of steps (the observation time) [14] .
